PRINZ’S CONSTITUTION MODEL OF MORAL JUDGMENT: A CRITICAL READING
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The purpose of this paper is to critically review Prinz’s constitution model. According to commonly suggested models, moral judgment is the result of specific cognitive processes that are intuitive, emotional or rational. According to Prinz, sentimentalist views argue that such judgments are caused by emotions. In contrast, he argues that moral judgment is constituted, not caused, by them. I will expose Prinz’s argument to support his proposal and outline some inconsistencies of it.
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Aceptado 2017-04-04
Publicado 2017-01-15
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