INTUICIONES Y RESTRICCIÓN DEL PRINCIPIO DE CIERRE
Closure Principle Principio de Cierre Transmission Principle Principio de Transmisión Fallibilism Falibilismo Scepticism Escepticismo Abominable Conjunction Conjunción Abominable
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Publicado:
ene. 15, 2014
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Artículos
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En este artículo, considero algunos supuestos costos intuitivos relativos a la negación de la generalidad del Principio de Cierre para el conocimiento. Usualmente los filósofos descartan tal negación como altamente contra-intuitiva pero argumento que, por lo menos en relación a los supuestos costos aquí considerados, esto es incorrecto: dadas nuestras intuiciones folk, no hay tales costos. Por lo tanto un falibilista que busca detener el argumento escéptico basado en el principio de cierre puede restringir el principio sin sufrir esos supuestos costos intuitivos.
De Brasi, L. (2014). INTUICIONES Y RESTRICCIÓN DEL PRINCIPIO DE CIERRE. Praxis Filosófica, (38), 225–248. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i38.3532
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Baumann, P. (2011): “Epistemic Closure”, en S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (eds), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, London: Routledge, pp. 597-608.
BonJour, L. (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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David, M. & Warfield, T. (2008): “Knowledge-Closure and Skepticism”, en Q. Smith (ed), Epistemology: New Essays, Oxford: OUP, pp. 137-88.
Davies, M. (1998): “Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant,” en C. MacDonald, B. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge, Oxford: OUP, pp. 321-361.
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De Brasi, L. (ms): “Testimony and Value in the Theory of Knowledge.”
DeRose, K. (1995): “Solving the Skeptical Problem”, Philosophical Review, 104, pp. 17-52.
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Greco, J. (2000). Putting Skeptics in Their Place, Cambridge: CUP.
Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford: OUP.
Hawthorne, J. (2005): “The Case for Closure”, en M. Steup & E. Sosa (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 26-42.
Hendricks, V. (2006). Mainstream and Formal Epistemology, Cambridge: CUP.
Kvanvig, J. (2008): “Closure and Alternative Possibilities”, en J. Greco (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, Oxford: OUP, pp. 456-83.
Lawlor, K. (2005): “Living without Closure”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 69, pp. 25-50.
Lewis, D. K. (1996): “Elusive Knowledge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, pp. 549-67.
McGinn, C. (1999). Knowledge and Reality, Oxford: Clarendon.
Neta, R. (2003): “Contextualism and the Problem of the External World”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66, pp. 1-31.
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Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic Luck, Oxford: OUP.
Pritchard, D. (2010): “Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination”, Nous, 44, pp. 245-68.
Pritchard, D. (2013). Epistemological Disjunctivism, Oxford: OUP.
Roush, S. (2005). Tracking Truth, Oxford: Clarendon.
Rysiew, P. (2001): “The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions”, Nous, 35, pp. 477-514.
Rysiew, P. (2005): “Contesting Contextualism”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 69, pp. 51-70.
Silins, N. (2005): “Transmission Failure Failure”, Philosophical Studies, 126, pp. 71-102.
Stroud, B. (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Oxford: Clarendon.
Turri, J. (2013): “A Conspicuous Art: Putting Gettier to the Test”, Philosopher’s Imprint, 13, pp. 1-16.
Vahid, H. (2008): “The Puzzle of Fallible Knowledge”, Metaphilosophy, 39, pp. 325-44.
Van Cleve, J. (2003): “Is Knowledge Easy—Or Impossible? Externalism as the Only Alternative to Skepticism”, en S. Luper (ed), The Skeptics, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, pp. 45-60.
Vogel, J. (2000): “Reliabilism Leveled”, Journal of Philosophy, 97, pp. 602-23.
Vogel, J. (2008): “Internalist Responses to Skepticism”, en J. Greco (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, Oxford: OUP, pp. 436-50.
Weinberg, J., niChoLs, S. & stiCh, S. (2001): “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”, Philosophical Topics, 29, pp. 429-60.
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: OUP. Wright, C. (2000): “Cogency and Question-Begging: Some reflections of McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof”, Philosophical Issues, 10, pp. 140-163.
Wright, C. (2003): “Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference”, en S. Nuccetelli (ed), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 57-78.
Austin, J. L. (1970). Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Baumann, P. (2011): “Epistemic Closure”, en S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (eds), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, London: Routledge, pp. 597-608.
BonJour, L. (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Boyd, K. & Nagel, J. (2014): “The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions”, en E. Machery & E. O’Neill (eds), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, London: Routledge.
Brown, J. (2004). Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, MA: MIT Press. Cohen, S. (1988): “How to be a Fallibilist”, Philosophical Perspectives, 2, pp. 91-123.
Cohen, S. (2000): “Contextualism and Skepticism”, Philosophical Issues, 10, pp. 94-107.
Cohen, S. (2002): “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65, pp. 309-29.
Cohen, S. (2005): “Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,70, pp. 417-30.
David, M. & Warfield, T. (2008): “Knowledge-Closure and Skepticism”, en Q. Smith (ed), Epistemology: New Essays, Oxford: OUP, pp. 137-88.
Davies, M. (1998): “Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant,” en C. MacDonald, B. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge, Oxford: OUP, pp. 321-361.
De Brasi, L. (forthcoming): “Accidentality and Knowledge after Gettier”, Filozofija.
De Brasi, L. (ms): “Testimony and Value in the Theory of Knowledge.”
DeRose, K. (1995): “Solving the Skeptical Problem”, Philosophical Review, 104, pp. 17-52.
Dretske, F. (2005): “The Case against Closure”, en M. Steup & E. Sosa (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 13-25.
Dretske, F. (2010): “Fred Dretske”, en J. Dancy, E. Sosa & M. Steup (eds), A Companion to Epistemology, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 130-4.
Goldman, A. I. (1976): “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”, Journal of Philosophy, 73, pp. 771-91.
Goldman, A. I. (1986). Epistemology and Cognition, MA: Harvard University Press.
Greco, J. (2000). Putting Skeptics in Their Place, Cambridge: CUP.
Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford: OUP.
Hawthorne, J. (2005): “The Case for Closure”, en M. Steup & E. Sosa (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 26-42.
Hendricks, V. (2006). Mainstream and Formal Epistemology, Cambridge: CUP.
Kvanvig, J. (2008): “Closure and Alternative Possibilities”, en J. Greco (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, Oxford: OUP, pp. 456-83.
Lawlor, K. (2005): “Living without Closure”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 69, pp. 25-50.
Lewis, D. K. (1996): “Elusive Knowledge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, pp. 549-67.
McGinn, C. (1999). Knowledge and Reality, Oxford: Clarendon.
Neta, R. (2003): “Contextualism and the Problem of the External World”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66, pp. 1-31.
Neta, R. (2005): “A Contextualist Solution to the Problem of Easy Knowledge”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 69, pp. 183-206.
Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic Luck, Oxford: OUP.
Pritchard, D. (2010): “Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination”, Nous, 44, pp. 245-68.
Pritchard, D. (2013). Epistemological Disjunctivism, Oxford: OUP.
Roush, S. (2005). Tracking Truth, Oxford: Clarendon.
Rysiew, P. (2001): “The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions”, Nous, 35, pp. 477-514.
Rysiew, P. (2005): “Contesting Contextualism”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 69, pp. 51-70.
Silins, N. (2005): “Transmission Failure Failure”, Philosophical Studies, 126, pp. 71-102.
Stroud, B. (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Oxford: Clarendon.
Turri, J. (2013): “A Conspicuous Art: Putting Gettier to the Test”, Philosopher’s Imprint, 13, pp. 1-16.
Vahid, H. (2008): “The Puzzle of Fallible Knowledge”, Metaphilosophy, 39, pp. 325-44.
Van Cleve, J. (2003): “Is Knowledge Easy—Or Impossible? Externalism as the Only Alternative to Skepticism”, en S. Luper (ed), The Skeptics, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, pp. 45-60.
Vogel, J. (2000): “Reliabilism Leveled”, Journal of Philosophy, 97, pp. 602-23.
Vogel, J. (2008): “Internalist Responses to Skepticism”, en J. Greco (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, Oxford: OUP, pp. 436-50.
Weinberg, J., niChoLs, S. & stiCh, S. (2001): “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”, Philosophical Topics, 29, pp. 429-60.
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: OUP. Wright, C. (2000): “Cogency and Question-Begging: Some reflections of McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof”, Philosophical Issues, 10, pp. 140-163.
Wright, C. (2003): “Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference”, en S. Nuccetelli (ed), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 57-78.
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