Epistemic Conservatism and Democratic Disagreement: A Model of Rationality Amidst Plurality of Opinions

https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i62.14298

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Published: Dec 9, 2025
Issue: No. 62 (2025): Praxis Filosófica No. 62 julio-diciembre 2025
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Authors

  Rodrigo Laera Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico (SADAF), Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Abstract

This paper examines the intersection between epistemic conservatism and democratic disagreement, proposing a mathematical model to understand how agents can rationally maintain their beliefs while adapting to diverse opinions in a deliberative context. Firstly, it argues that a moderate degree of epistemic conservatism can be beneficial for democratic stability, acting as a mechanism that preserves diversity of opinions while maintaining social cohesion. Secondly, it aims to demonstrate the existence of an optimal level of conservatism that maximizes both stability and adaptability of the democratic system, where the diversity of beliefs in a democratic society follows predictable and quantifiable patterns, with significant implications for the design of democratic institutions and processes. Finally, it suggests that persistent disagreement is not necessarily a failure of the democratic system but an emergent feature of the interaction between agents with different degrees of epistemic conservatism, where the convergence time to a consensus is inversely related to the degree of openness to change in the population.

Keywords
  • Epistemic conservatism
  • Deliberative democracy
  • Disagreement
  • Consensus
  • Rationality
Author Biography

Rodrigo Laera, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico (SADAF), Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Doctor en Filosofía por la Universidad de Barcelona e Investigador Adjunto del Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) de Argentina. Se desempeña en el Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas (IIF-CONICET). Sus áreas de investigación se concentran en epistemología, filosofía de la economía y metafilosofía. Entre sus publicaciones destacadas se encuentra el libro Los desvíos de la Razón: el lugar de la facticidad en la epistemología (Miño y Dávila, 2011), además de numerosos artículos en revistas académicas especializadas sobre temas como el contextualismo meta-epistemológico, el problema del criterio, las limitaciones de la evidencia y los problemas epistemológicos de la prospectiva económica. Ha desarrollado investigación en el marco de proyectos financiados por el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación de España y participa activamente en la comunidad académica internacional de filosofía analítica.

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How to Cite
Laera, R. (2025). Epistemic Conservatism and Democratic Disagreement: A Model of Rationality Amidst Plurality of Opinions: . Praxis Filosófica, (62), e20814298. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i62.14298
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