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In this paper I critically examine Davidson’s view according to whichreasons are causes of action and I contrast it with the one which flows fromWittgenstein’s grammatical analyses aiming at showing that such a view isjust absurd. I show, on the one hand, that Davidson’s stance is grounded on avariety of conceptual misapprehensions and, on the other hand, I emphasizethe genuine clarifying character of Wittgenstein’s remarks.

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Tomasini, A. (2016). Reasons and causes: Wittgenstein versus Davidson. Praxis Filosófica, (43), 13–36. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i43.3153

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