Axiological dissensus between scientific realists and anti-realists
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The importance of epistemic values for the adoption either of the scientific realist or anti realist stance in the context of the philosophy of science is illustrated via three scientific debates. These debates are: i) the one on whether one should search or not for an explanation of the extraordinary low entropy of our early universe, ii) the debate on whether empirical nomic regularities require or not of an explanation in terms of natural laws, and iii) the debate between Clarke and Leibniz on the nature of physical space. In these debates in general realists have as a priority the search of causal explanations, and thus the minimisation of the number of brute facts, while anti realists search to minimise the number of unobservable scientific entities. Since this disagreement on goals seems not to be soluble without begging the question, or a stipulation in favour of one or the other of these goals, then isosthenia (that is the arguments for one, or the other, of these stances seem to be balanced, they seem to be equally plausible), and from this follows a suspension of judgement on which of these two stances is the objectively correct one, as well as an epistemic voluntarism on which of these stances to adopt.
- Epistemic stances
- Isosthenia
- Epistemic voluntarism
- Axiological dissensus
- Scientific realism
- Empiricism
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Accepted 2018-01-26
Published 2017-07-15
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