Categorial empirical conceptualism
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Jul 15, 2017
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My aim in this paper is to lay down the main lineaments for a revised version of conceptualism, in the debate between conceptualists and non-conceptualists about the type of content of perceptual experience. A version that subscribes to the main thesis of traditional conceptualism while being able, unlike it, to give satisfactory answers to the perceptual experience’s fineness of grain problem. In order to do this, I introduce a general theoretical framework, the Empirical Conceptualism, develop a substantive conceptualist position from it, the Categorial Empirical Conceptualism, and show how this position could be used to answer the fineness of grain problem.
- Perceptual experience
- Conceptual content
- Non-conceptual content
- Categorization
- Fineness of grain
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Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
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Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
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Lupyan, G. (2012). “Linguistically Modulated Perception and Cognition: The Label-Feedback Hypothesis”, Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 3, pp. 1-13.
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Margolis E., y Laurence S. (2007). “The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?”, Noûs, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 561-593.
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McDowell J. (1998). “Reply to Commentators”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 403-431.
McDowell J. (2009). Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars.Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
Peacocke, C. (1986). “Perceptual Content”, en Themes from Kaplan, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 297-329.
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McDowell J. (2001). “Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 5, pp. 239-264.
Piccinini, G. y Scott, S. (2006). “Splitting Concepts”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 390-409.
Prinz, J. (2002). Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press.
Rosch, E. (1978). “Principles of categorization”, en E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and Categorization, Hillsdale, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 27-48.
Skidelsky, L. (2006). “Personal-Subpersonal: The Problem of Inter-level Relations”, Protosociology, Special Issue: Compositionality, Concepts and Representations II: New Problems in Cognitive Science, 22, pp. 120-139.
Skidelsky, L. (2007). “La distinción doxástico-subdoxástico”, Crítica, Vol. 39, No. 115, pp. 31-60.
Speaks, J. (2005). “Is There a Problem about Nonconceptual Content?”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 3, pp. 359-398.
Sperling, G. (1960). “The information available in brief visual presentations”, Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 74 (11, No. 498), pp. 1-29.
Spelke, E. (1990). “Principles of Object Perception”, Cognitive Science, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 29-56.
Spelke, E. (1992). “Origins of Knowledge”, Psychological Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 605-632.
Sun Y., Cai Y., Lu S. (2015). “Hemispheric asymmetry in the influence of language on visual perception”, Consciousness and Cognition, 34:16–27.
Thierry G., et alia (2009). “Unconscious effects of language-specific terminology on preattentive color perception”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 106, No. 11, pp. 4567–4570.
Winawer, J., et alia (2007). “Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 104, No.19, pp. 7780-7785.
Bermúdez, J. (1994). “Peacocke’s Argument against the Autonomy of Nonconceptual Representational Content”, en Gunther, Y., H., (Ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (2003), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, pp. 293-307.
Bermúdez, J. (1998). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press.
Bermúdez, J. (2007). “What Is at Stake in the Debate on Nonconceptual Content?”, Noûs, Vol. 41, Suplemento: Philosophical Perspectives, 21, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 55-72.
Brewer, B. (1999). Perception and Reason, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Brewer, B. (2001). “Précis of Perception and Reason”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 405-416.
Brewer, B. (2005). “Perceptual experience has conceptual content”, en E. Sosa y M. Steup (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 217-230.
Byrne, A. (2005). “Perception and Conceptual Content”, en E. Sosa y M. Steup (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 231-250.
Carruthers, P. (2006). The Architecture of the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, H., y Lefebvre, C. (Eds.) (2005). Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science, Oxford, Elsevier.
Coltheart, M. (1983). “Ecological necessity of iconic memory”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6, pp. 17-18.
Crane, T. (1988). “The Waterfall Ilussion”, en Gunther, Y., H., (Ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (2003), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, pp. 231-236.
Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
Fodor, J. (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, New York, Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J.(2007). “The revenge of the given”, en B.P. McLaughlin y J. Cohen (eds.) Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, Malden (Mass.)/Oxford/Carlton (Victoria), Blackwell, pp. 105-116.
Fodor, J. (2008). LOT2.The language of thought revisited, Oxford, Oxford U.P.
Forder, L., et alia (2016). “Colour terms affect detection of colour and color-associated objects suppressed from visual awareness”, PLoS ONE 11(3): e0152212.
Harnad, S. (2005). “To Cognize is to Categorize: Cognition is Categorization”, en H. Cohen and C. Lefebvre (Eds.) Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science, Oxford, Elsevier, pp. 19-30.
Heck, R., G. (2000). “Non-Conceptual Content and the ‘Space of Reasons’”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 4, pp. 483-523.
Lupyan, G. (2012). “Linguistically Modulated Perception and Cognition: The Label-Feedback Hypothesis”, Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 3, pp. 1-13.
Lupyan, G., y Ward, E. J. (2013). “Language can boost otherwise unseen objects into visual awareness”, Proceedings of the Natural Academy of Sciences, Vol. 110, No. 35, pp. 14196-14201.
Margolis E., y Laurence S. (2007). “The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?”, Noûs, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 561-593.
McDowell J. (1994a). Mind and World, Cambridge, Massachusets, Harvard University Press.
McDowell J. (1994b). “The content of perceptual experience”, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 175, pp. 190-205.
McDowell J. (1996). “Afterword”, en Mind and World (1996), Cambridge, Massachusets, Harvard University Press.
McDowell J. (1998). “Reply to Commentators”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 403-431.
McDowell J. (2009). Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars.Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
Peacocke, C. (1986). “Perceptual Content”, en Themes from Kaplan, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 297-329.
McDowell J. (1992). “Scenarios, Concepts, and Perception”, en Gunther, Y., H., (Ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (2003), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, pp. 107-132.
McDowell J. (1994). “Nonconceptual Content: Kinds, Rationales, and Relations”, en Gunther, Y., H., (Ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (2003), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, pp. 309-322.
McDowell J. (1998). “Nonconceptual Content Defended (Comment on McDowell’s ‘Mind and World’)”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 381-88.
McDowell J. (2001). “Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 5, pp. 239-264.
Piccinini, G. y Scott, S. (2006). “Splitting Concepts”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 390-409.
Prinz, J. (2002). Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press.
Rosch, E. (1978). “Principles of categorization”, en E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and Categorization, Hillsdale, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 27-48.
Skidelsky, L. (2006). “Personal-Subpersonal: The Problem of Inter-level Relations”, Protosociology, Special Issue: Compositionality, Concepts and Representations II: New Problems in Cognitive Science, 22, pp. 120-139.
Skidelsky, L. (2007). “La distinción doxástico-subdoxástico”, Crítica, Vol. 39, No. 115, pp. 31-60.
Speaks, J. (2005). “Is There a Problem about Nonconceptual Content?”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 3, pp. 359-398.
Sperling, G. (1960). “The information available in brief visual presentations”, Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 74 (11, No. 498), pp. 1-29.
Spelke, E. (1990). “Principles of Object Perception”, Cognitive Science, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 29-56.
Spelke, E. (1992). “Origins of Knowledge”, Psychological Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 605-632.
Sun Y., Cai Y., Lu S. (2015). “Hemispheric asymmetry in the influence of language on visual perception”, Consciousness and Cognition, 34:16–27.
Thierry G., et alia (2009). “Unconscious effects of language-specific terminology on preattentive color perception”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 106, No. 11, pp. 4567–4570.
Winawer, J., et alia (2007). “Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 104, No.19, pp. 7780-7785.
Serrano, N. A. (2017). Categorial empirical conceptualism. Praxis Filosófica, (45S), 113–143. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i45S.6131
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Received 2018-01-31
Accepted 2018-01-31
Published 2017-07-15
Accepted 2018-01-31
Published 2017-07-15
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